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Howdoesaneconomyadjustfromaregimeofeasycredittooneoftightcredit? Suppose
it is relatively easy for consumers to borrow and the economy is in a stationary state
with a stable distribution of borrowing and lending positions. An unexpected shock
hits the ﬁnancial system and borrowing gets harder in terms of tighter borrowing limits
and/or in terms of higher credit spreads. The most indebted consumers need to readjust
towards lower levels of debt (delevaraging). Since the debtor position of one agent is the
creditor position of another, this also means that lenders have to reduce their holdings
of ﬁnancial claims. How are the spending decisions of borrowers and lenders affected
by this economy-wide ﬁnancial adjustment? What happens to aggregate activity? How
long does the adjustment last?
In this paper, we address these questions, focusing on the response of the household
sector, using a workhorse Bewley (1977) model in which households borrow and lend
to smooth transitory income ﬂuctuations. Since the model cannot be solved analytically,
our approach is to obtain numerical results under plausible parametrizations and then
to explore the mechanism behind them. The model captures two channels in the con-
sumers’ response to a reduction in their borrowing capacity. First, a direct channel, by
which constrained borrowers are forced to reduce their indebtedness. Second, a pre-
cautionary channel, by which unconstrained agents increase their savings as a buffer
against future shocks. Both channels increase net lending in the economy, so the equi-
librium interest rate has to fall in equilibrium.
Our analysis leads to two sets of results. First, we look at interest rate dynamics and
show that they are characterized by a sharp initial fall followed by a gradual adjustment
to a new, lower steady state. The reason for this interest rate overshooting is that, at
the initial asset distribution, the agents at the lower end of the distribution try to adjust
faster towards a higher savings target. So the initial increase in net lending is stronger.
To keep the asset market in equilibrium, interest rates have to fall sharply. As the asset
distribution converges to the new steady state the net lending pressure subsides and the
interest rate moves gradually up.
Second, we look at the responses of aggregate activity. Overly indebted agents can
adjust in two ways: by spending less and by working more. In our model they do both,
1so, for a given interest rate, the credit shock would lead to a reduction in consumer
spending and to an increase in labor supply. Whether a recession follows depends on
the relative strength of these two forces and on the interest rate elasticity of consumption
and labor supply. In our baseline calibration, the consumption side dominates and out-
put declines. As for the case of interest rates, the contraction is stronger in the short run,
when the distribution of asset holdings is far from its new steady state and some agents
are far below their savings target. A tightening of the credit limit that reduces household
debt-to-GDP by 10 percentage points generates a 1% drop in output on impact.
We then add nominal rigidities to the model. In presence of nominal rigidities, the
zerolowerboundonthenominalinterestratemeansthatthecentralbankmaybeunable
to achieve the real interest rate that replicates the ﬂexible price allocation. Moreover,
with nominal rigidities, aggregate activity is purely driven by the response of consumer
demand. Therefore, when the zero lower bound is binding the households’ net saving
pressure translates into a larger output drop.
Finally, we generalize the model to include durable consumption goods, which can
be used as collateral. In this extension, households face a richer portfolio choice as they
can invest in liquid bonds or in durable goods. To make bonds and durables imperfect
substitutes, we assume a proportional cost of re-selling durables, so that durables are
less liquid. After a credit crunch, net borrowers are forced to delevarage and have to
reduce consumption of durable and non-durable goods. On the other hand, the pre-
cautionary motive induces net lenders to save more by accumulating both bonds and
durables. Durable purchases may increase or decrease, depending on the strength of
these two effects. In our calibration, the net effect depends on the nature of the shock. A
pure shock to the credit limit affects only borrowers close to the limit, so the lenders’ side
dominates and durable purchases increase. A shock to credit spreads, on the other hand,
affects alarger fractionof borrowers, leading toa contractionin durablepurchases. Here
the output effects can be large, leading to a 4% drop in consumption following a transi-
tory shock that raises the spread on a one year loan from 1% to 3.8%. The consumption
drop can be as large as 10% if prices are ﬁxed and the zero lower bound is binding.
Our paper focuses on households’ balance sheets adjustment and consumer spend-
ing and is complementary to a growing literature that looks at the effects of credit shocks
2on ﬁrms’ balance sheets and investment spending.1 Hall (2011a, 2011b) argues that the
response of the household sector to the credit tightening is an essential ingredient to ac-
count for the recent U.S. recession. Mian and Suﬁ (2011a, 2011b) use cross-state evidence
to argue that the contraction in households’ borrowing capacity, mainly driven by a de-
cline in house prices, was responsible for the fall in consumer spending and, eventually,
for the increase in unemployment. Our model aims to capture the effects of a similar
contraction in households’ borrowing capacity in general equilibrium.
In modeling the household sector, we follow the vast literature on consumption and
saving in incomplete market economies with idiosyncratic income uncertainty, going
back to Bewley (1977), Deaton (1991), Huggett (1993), Aiyagari (1994), Carroll (1997).2
Our approach is to compute the economy’s transitional dynamics after a one-time, un-
expected aggregate shock. This relates our paper to recent contributions that look at
transitional dynamics after different types of shocks.3 Much work on business cycles
in economies with heterogenous agents and incomplete markets, follows Krusell and
Smith (1998) and looks at approximate equilibria in which prices evolve as functions of
a ﬁnite set of moments of the wealth distribution. Here, we prefer to keep the entire
wealth distribution as a state variable at the cost of focusing on a one time shock, be-
cause our shock affects very differently agents in different regions of the distribution.4
Midrigan and Philippon (2011) take a different (and complementary) approach to mod-
eling the effects of a credit crunch on the household sector. They use a cash-in-advance
model to explore the idea that credit access, as money, is needed to facilitate transac-
tions. Finally, our model with durables is related to Carroll and Dunn (1997), an early
paper that uses an heterogenous agent, incomplete market model with durable and non-
durablegoodstolookatthedynamicsofconsumerdebtandspendingfollowingashock
1Classic models of the role of ﬁrms’ balance sheets are Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). Recent contributions include Jermann and Quadrini (2009), Brunnermeier
and Sannikov (2010), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Khan and Thomas (2010), Buera and Moll (2011), Del
Negro, Eggertsson, Ferrero, and Kiyotaki (2011), Cagetti, De Nardi, and Bassetto (2011). Goldberg (2011)
is a model that combines ﬁnancial frictions on both the ﬁrms’ and the households’ side, but focuses on
steady states.
2Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2009) offer an excellent review.
3For example, Mendoza, Rios Rull and Quadrini (2010) look at the response of an economy opening
up to international asset trade.
4Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2009) point out that the nature of the shock is important in
determining whether or not an heterogenous agent economy behaves approximately as its representative
agent counterpart.
3to unemployment risk.
The modern monetary policy literature has pointed out that at the roots of a liquidity
trap there must be a shock that sharply reduces the ”natural“ interest rate, that is, the
interest rate that would arise in a ﬂexible price economy (Krugman, 1998; Woodford
and Eggertsson, 2001). In representative agent models, the literature typically generates
aliquiditytrapbyintroducingashocktointertemporalpreferences, whichmechanically
increase the consumer’s willingness to save (e.g., Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo,
2011). Our modelshowsthatina heterogenousagentenvironment, shocksto theagents’
borrowing capacity can be the underlying force that pushes down the natural rate, by
reducing the demand for loans by borrowers and by increasing the supply of loans by
lenders. This is consistent with the fact that, historically, liquidity trap episodes have
always followed disruptions in credit markets. Two independent recent papers, Curdia
and Woodford (2010) and Eggertsson and Krugman (2011), draw related connections
between credit crises and the liquidity trap. The main difference is that they work with
a representative borrower and a representative lender and mute wealth dynamics to
aim for analytical tractability.5 This implies that there is no precautionary effect on the
lenders’ side and that there is no internal dynamics associated to the wealth distribution.
As we shall see, in our model the dynamics of the wealth distribution play an important
role in generating large swings in the natural interest rates.
Two papers that explore the effects of precautionary behavior on business cycle ﬂuc-
tuations are Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2009) and Challe and Ragot (2011). Both papers,
derive analytical results under simplifying assumptions that eliminate the wealth dis-
tribution from the problem’s state variables. In this paper we take a computational
approach, to study how the adjustment mechanism works when the wealth distribution
evolves endogenously. Another related paper is Chamley (2010), a theoretical paper
which explores the role of the precautionary motive in a monetary environment and
focuses on the possibility of multiple equilibria.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our model and charac-
terize the steady state. In Section 3, we perform our main exercise, that is, we analyze
5Iacoviello (2005) is an early paper that studies monetary policy in a two-types model where house-
holds borrow to ﬁnance housing purchases, facing a collateral constraint similar to that in our durable
section.
4the equilibrium transitional dynamics after an unexpected permanent tightening of the
borrowing limit. Section 4 explores the role of nominal rigidities. Section 5 studies the
effects of ﬁscal policy. Section 6 presents the results of the extended model with durable
consumption goods. Section 7 concludes. In the appendix, we describe our computa-
tional strategy.
2 Model
Weconsideramodelofhouseholdsfacingidiosyncraticincomeuncertainty, whosmooth
consumption by borrowing and lending. The model is a standard incomplete markets
model in the tradition of Bewley (1977), with endogenous labor supply and no capi-
tal. The only asset traded is a one-period risk-free bond. Households can borrow up to
an exogenous limit, which is tighter than the natural borrowing limit. We ﬁrst analyze
the steady state equilibrium for a given borrowing limit. Then, we study transitional
dynamics following an unexpected, one time shock that reduces this limit.
There is a continuum of inﬁnitely lived households with preferences represented by
the utility function
E
"
¥
å
t=0
btU(cit,nit)
#
,
where cit is consumption and nit is labor effort of household i. Each household produces
consumption goods using the linear technology
yit = qitnit,
where qit is an idiosyncratic shock to the labor productivity of household i, which fol-
lows a Markov chain on the space

q1,...,qS	
. We assume q1 = 0 and interpret this
realization of the shock as unemployment. For the moment, there are no aggregate
shocks.
The household budget constraint is
qtbit+1 + cit + ˜ tit  bit + yit,
where bit are bond holdings, qt is the bond price and ˜ tit are taxes. Tax payments are as
follows: all households pay a lump sum tax tt and the unemployed receive the unem-
5ployment beneﬁt ut. That is, ˜ tit = tt if qit > 0 and ˜ tit = tt   ut if qit = 0.6 Household
debt is bounded below by the exogenous limit f, that is, bond holdings must satisfy
bit+1   f. (1)
The interest rate implicit in the bond price is rt = 1/qt   1.
The government chooses the aggregate supply of bonds Bt, the unemployment ben-
eﬁt ut and the lump sum tax tt so as to satisfy the budget constraint:
Bt + utu = qtBt+1 + tt,
where u = Pr(qit = 0) is the fraction of unemployed agents in the population. For now,
we assume that the supply of government bonds and the unemployment beneﬁt are
kept constant at B and u, while the tax tt adjusts to ensure government budget balance.
In Section 5, we consider alternative ﬁscal policies.
In the model, the only supply of bonds outside the household sector comes from the
government. When we calibrate the model, we interpret the bond supply B broadly
as the sum of all liquid assets held by the household sector. The main deviation from
Aiyagari (1994) and the following general equilibrium literature is the absence of capital
in our model. The standard assumption in models with capital is that ﬁrms can issue
claims to physical capital that are perfect substitutes for government bonds and other
safe and liquid stores of value. This would not be a satisfactory assumption here, since
we are trying to capture the effects of a credit crisis. A more general model of a credit
crisis would have to include the effects of the crisis on the ability of ﬁrms to issue ﬁnan-
cial claims and on their accumulation of precautionary reserves, and it would have to
allow for imperfect substitutability between different assets.7 Here, we choose to focus
on the household sector and we close the model by taking as given the net supply of liq-
uid assets coming from the rest of the economy, B. In Section 6, we enrich the household
portfolio choice by allowing households to accumulate both bonds and durable goods,
which are a form of capital directly employed by the households. In that setup, we will
introduce imperfect substitutability between the two assets.
In our baseline model, the only motive for borrowing and lending comes from in-
come uncertainty. In particular, we abstract from life-cycle considerations and from
6The presence of the unemployment beneﬁt ensures that the natural borrowing limit is strictly positive.
7Along the lines of models such as those mentioned in footnote 1.
6other important drivers of household borrowing and lending dynamics, like durable
purchases, health expenses, educational expenses, etc. Moreover, we assume that there
is a single interest rate rt, which applies both to positive and negative bond holdings,
so that household can borrow or lend at the same rate. In Section 6, we address some
of these limitations, by modeling durable purchases and introducing a spread between
borrowing and lending rates.
2.1 Equilibrium
Given a sequence of interest rates frtg and taxes fttg, let Ct (b,q) and Nt (b,q) denote
the optimal consumption and labor supply at time t of a household with bond holdings
bit = b and productivity qit = q. Given consumption and labor supply, next period
bond holdings are derived from the budget constraint. Therefore, the transition for bond
holdings is fully determined by the functions Ct (b,q) and Nt (b,q).
Let Yt (b,q) denote the joint distribution of bond holdings and current productivity
levels in the population. The household’s optimal transition for bond holdings together
with the Markov process for productivity yield a transition probability for the individ-
ual states (b,q). This transition probability determines the distribution Yt+1, given the
distribution Yt. We are now ready to deﬁne an equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 1 An equilibrium is a sequence of interest rates frtg, a sequence of consumption
and labor supply policies fCt (b,q), Nt (b,q)g, a sequence of taxes fttg, and a sequence of dis-
tributions for bond holdings and productivity levels fYtg such that, given the initial distribution
Y0:
(i) Ct (b,q) and Nt (b,q) are optimal given frtg and fttg,
(ii) Yt is consistent with the consumption and labor supply policies,
(iii) the tax satisﬁes the government budget constraint,
tt = uu + rtB/(1+ rt),
(iv) the bonds market clears, Z
bdYt (b,q) = B.
7The optimal policies for consumption and labor supply are characterized by two
optimality conditions. The Euler equation
Uc(cit,nit)  b(1+ rt) Et [Uc(cit+1,nit+1)], (2)
which holds with equality if the borrowing constraint bit+1   f is slack. And the
optimality condition for labor supply
qitUc(cit,nit) + Un(cit,nit) = 0, (3)
if qit > 0 and nit = 0 otherwise.
As we will see below, a tightening of the borrowing limit makes future consumption
more responsive to income shocks, so that agents face higher future volatility. With
prudence in preferences, this implies that the expected marginal utility on the right-
hand side of (2) is higher, by Jensen’s inequality. Therefore, for a given level of interest
rates, consumption today falls, as if there was a negative preference shock reducing the
marginalutilityofconsumptiontoday. Inthissense, amodelwithprecautionarysavings
provides a microfoundation for models that use preference shocks to push the economy
in a liquidity trap.
2.2 Calibration
We will analyze the model by numerical simulations, so we ﬁrst need to specify pref-
erences and choose parameter values. We assume the utility function is separable and
isoelastic in consumption and leisure
U(c,n) =
c1 g
1  g
+ y
(1  n)
1 h
1  h
.
Our baseline parameters are reported in Table 1. The time period is a quarter. The
discount factor b is chosen to yield a yearly interest rate of 2.5% in the initial steady state.
The coefﬁcient of risk aversion is g = 4. Clearly, this coefﬁcient is crucial in determining
precautionary behavior, so we will experiment with different values. The parameter
h is chosen so that the average Frisch elasticity of labor supply is 1. The parameter y
is chosen so that average hours worked for employed workers are 40% of their time
endowment, in line with the evidence in Nekarda and Ramey (2010).8
8Figure 1 in their paper shows about 39 weekly hours per worker in 2000-2008. Subtracting 70 hours
per week for sleep and personal care from the time endowment, we obtain 39/98 = 0.40.
8Table 1: Parameter Values
Parameter Explanation Value Target/Source
b Discount factor 0.9713 Interest rate r = 2.5%
g Coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion 4
h Curvature of utility from leisure 1.88 Average Frisch elasticity = 1
y Coefﬁcient on leisure in utility 12.48 Average hours worked = 0.4
(Nekarda and Ramey, 2010)
r Persistence of productivity shock 0.967 Persistence of wage process in Flo-
den and Lind´ e (2001)
s# Variance of productivity shock 0.017 VarianceofwageprocessinFloden
and Lind´ e (2001)
pe,u Transition to unemployment 0.057 Shimer (2005)
pu,e Transition to employment 0.882 Shimer (2005)
u Unemployment beneﬁt 0.10 40% of average labor income
f Borrowing limit 1.04 Debt-to-GDP ratio of 0.18
B Bond supply 1.60 Liquid-assets-to-GDP ratio of 1.78
Note: The quantities u, f and B are expressed in terms of yearly aggregate output. See the text
for details on the targets.
The process for qit is chosen to capture wage and employment uncertainty. We as-
sume that, when positive, qit follows an AR1 process in logs with autocorrelation r and
variance s2
# . The parameters r and s2
# are chosen to match the evidence in Floden and
Lind´ e (2001), who use yearly panel data from the PSID to estimate the stochastic pro-
cess for individual wages in the U.S. In particular, our parameters yield a coefﬁcient of
autocorrelation of 0.9136 and a conditional variance of 0.0426 for yearly wages, match-
ing the same moments of the persistent component of their wage process.9 The wage
process is approximated by a 12-state Markov chain, following the approach in Tauchen
(1986). For the transitions between employment and unemployment we follow Shimer
(2005), who estimates the ﬁnding rate and the separation rate from CPS data. At a quar-
9See Table IV in Floden and Lind´ e (2001). The relation between quarterly and annual parameters
(denoted by the subscript a) is r = r1/4
a and
s2
# =
8
 
1  r2
2+ 3r + 2r2 + r3
s2
#,a
1  r2
a
.
9terly frequency, we then choose transition probabilities equal to 0.057 from employment
to unemployment and equal to 0.882 from unemployment to employment. When ﬁrst
employed workers draw q from its unconditional distribution. For the unemployment
beneﬁt u, we also follow Shimer (2005) and set it to 40% of average labor income.
Finally, we choose values for the bonds supply B and the borrowing limit f to reﬂect
U.S. households’ balance sheets in 2006, before the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis. Deﬁning
liquid assets broadly as the sum of all deposits plus securities held directly by house-
holds, the liquid assets to GDP ratio in 2006 was equal to 1.78.10 We choose B to match
this ratio, computing liquid assets as the sum of households’ positive bond holdings.
Second, we match debt in our model to consumer credit, which was 18% of GDP in
2006.11 We choose f to match this ratio, computing debt as the sum of households’ neg-
ative bond holdings. The value of f that we obtain in this way is equal to about 1 year
of the average income. At this stage, we are leaving aside two important elements of the
households’ balance sheet: housing wealth and mortgage debt. The model with durable
goods in Section 6 will bring these elements back into the picture.
2.3 Steady state
To conclude this section, we brieﬂy describe the household policies in steady state. Fig-
ure 1 shows the optimal values of consumption and labor supply as a function of the
initial level of bond holdings, for two productivity levels: q = 0.346, the lowest positive
level in our grid (solid blue line), and q = 1.101, which is the average value (dashed
green line).
Different responses at different levels of bond holdings are apparent. At high levels
of b, consumer behavior is close to the permanent income hypothesis and the consump-
tion function is almost linear in b. For lower levels of bond holdings, the consumption
function is concave, as is common in precautionary savings models (Carroll and Kim-
ball, 1996). The optimality condition for labor supply implies that the relation between
bond holdings and labor supply mirrors that of consumption, capturing an income ef-
fect. In particular, at low levels of b a steeply increasing consumption function translates
10Federal Reserve Board Flow of Funds (Z.1) table B.100, sum of lines 9, 16, 19, 20, 21, 24, and 25.
11Also in table B.100, line 34, which essentially corresponds to total household liabilities minus mort-
gage debt.
10Figure 1: Optimal Consumption and Labor Supply in Steady State
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Note: Consumption and bonds are in terms of steady state yearly aggregate output.
into a steeply decreasing labor supply function, making it convex. For most levels of b
the substitution effect dominates the income effect and higher wages are associated to
higher labor supply. For very low levels of b, however, the income effect dominates and
low wage households supply more hours than high wage households.
3 Credit Crunch
We now explore the response of our economy to a credit crunch. We consider an econ-
omy that at t = 0 is in steady state with the borrowing limit f = 1.04. We then look at
the effects of an unexpected shock at t = 1 that gradually and permanently decreases
the borrowing limit to f0 = 0.58. The size of the shock is chosen so that the debt-to-GDP
ratio drops by 10 percentage points in the new steady state.
Starting at t = 1, the borrowing limit ft follows the linear adjustment path
ft = max

f0,f   Dt
	
,
and households perfectly anticipate this path. We choose D so that the adjustment lasts
6 quarters. Since all debt in the model has a one-quarter maturity, a sudden adjustment
11Figure 2: Bond Market Equilibrium in Steady State
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
aggregate bond holdings
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
 
r
a
t
e
initial steady
state
new steady
state
bond supply
Note: Interest rate is in annual terms.
in the debt limit would require unrealistically large repayments by the most indebted
households. An assumption of gradual adjustment of the debt limit is a simple way of
capturing the fact that actual debt maturities are longer than a quarter, so that after a
credit crunch households can gradually pay back their debt. An adjustment period of 6
quarters ensures that no household is forced into default. Default and bankruptcy are
clearly an important element of the adjustment to a tighter credit regime, but we abstract
from them.
Before looking at transitional dynamics, let us brieﬂy compare the interest rate in
the two steady states. In Figure 2 we plot the aggregate bond demand in the initial
steady state (solid blue line) and in the new steady state (dashed green line). Two effects
contribute to shifting the demand curve to the right in the new steady state. First there
is a mechanical effect, as all households with debt larger than f0 need to reduce their
debt. Second there is a precautionary effect, as households accumulate more wealth to
stay away from the borrowing limit. As the supply of bonds is ﬁxed at B, the shift in
bond demand leads to a lower equilibrium interest rate.
12Figure 3: Interest Rate and Output Responses
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3.1 Transitional dynamics: interest rate
Figure 3 illustrates the economy’s response to the debt limit contraction. In the top left
panel, we plot the exogenous adjustment path for ft. The remaining panels show the
responses of the debt-to-GDP ratio (top right panel), of the interest rate (bottom left
panel), and of output (bottom right panel).
The interest rate drops sharply after the shock, going negative for 6 quarters. The in-
terest rate overshooting after a debt contraction is our ﬁrst main result. From numerical
experiments, this result seems a fairly general qualitative outcome of this class of mod-
els and not just the consequence of our choice of parameters. To provide some intuition,
we now identify some properties of the household policy functions and of the steady
state distributions that help explain the result.
Let us ﬁrst look at the policy functions. The top panel of Figure 4 plots the optimal
bond accumulation bit+1  bit (averaged over q) as a function of the initial bond holdings
bit, at the initial steady state (solid blue line) and at the new steady state (dashed green
line). The function is very steep at low levels of bond holdings and ﬂatter at higher
13Figure 4: Bond Accumulation and Distributions in the Two Steady States
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levels, reﬂecting the strong incentives to save for households at the left tail of the distri-
bution, who want to move away from their borrowing limit. Notice that the convexity
of the bond accumulation function follows from the budget constraint, the concavity of
the consumption function and the convexity of the labor supply function (see Figure 1).
Consider next the stationary bond distributions. The bottom panel of Figure 4 shows
the marginal density of bond holdings at the initial steady state (solid blue line) and at
the new steady state (dashed green line). The two distributions have the same average,
as the bond supply is the same in the two steady states, but the new distribution is
more concentrated.12 A comparison of the policies in the top panel helps to explain
why. At low levels of bond holdings, the precautionary behavior induces agents in the
new steady state to accumulate bonds faster. At high levels of bond holdings, the low
equilibrium interest rate induces agents to decumulate bonds faster. This makes bond
holdings mean-revert faster and makes the stationary distribution more concentrated.
We are now ready to put the pieces together. In equilibrium, aggregate net bond
accumulation must be zero as the bond supply is ﬁxed. In steady state, this means the
12Formally, the initial distribution is a mean-preserving spread of the new distribution. We checked this
property numerically plotting the integral of the CDF of b for the two distributions.
14integral of the solid (dashed) function in the top panel weighted by the solid (dashed)
density in the bottom panel is equal to zero. Let us make a “disequilibrium” experiment
and suppose the interest rate jumped to its new steady state value at t = 1 and stayed
there from then on. Average bond accumulation could then be computed by integrating
the dashed function in the top panel weighted by the solid density in the bottom panel.
This gives a positive number, because the bond accumulation function is convex and
the solid distribution is a mean-preserving spread of the dashed one. Therefore, at the
conjectured interest rate path, there is excess demand of bonds and we need a lower
interest in the initial periods to equilibrate the bonds market. Intuitively, the economy
begins with too many households at low levels of debt, with a strong incentive to save,
and this pushes down equilibrium interest rates. As the economy reaches its new steady
state, thelowertailofthedistributionconvergestowardshigherlevelsofbondholdings,
the saving pressure subsides, and the interest rate adjusts up.
3.2 Transitional dynamics: output
Next, we want to understand what happens to output. The bottom right panel of Figure
3 shows that output contracts by 1% on impact and then recovers, converging towards
a level slightly lower than the initial steady state. We will consider below variations
leading to larger output responses. But ﬁrst let us understand the mechanism in our
baseline exercise.
The output response depends on the combination of consumption and labor sup-
ply decisions. To understand the transitional dynamics of output, let us make the same
disequilibrium experiment of the last subsection and suppose the interest rate jumped
directly to its new steady state level at t = 1. Recall that the consumption and labor
supply policies in Figure 1 are, respectively, a concave function and a convex function
of bond holdings. Then, given that the initial bond distribution is a mean-preserving
spread of the new steady state distribution, average consumption demand is lower than
at the new steady state and average labor supply is higher. Therefore, at the conjec-
tured interest path, there is excess supply in the goods market, which corresponds to
the excess demand in the bond market discussed above.
The short-run drop in the interest rate equilibrates the goods market both by increas-
15ing consumption and by lowering labor supply, via intertemporal substitution channels.
The market clearing level of output can then, in general, be above or below its new
steady state level, depending on whether the adjustment is more on the consumption
side or on the labor supply side. Two sets of considerations determine which side of
the goods market dominates the adjustment path: (i) how large are the shifts in con-
sumption and labor supply for a given interest rate, and (ii) how interest rate elastic
are consumption and labor supply. Our parameters imply that the fall in consumption
demand is the dominating factor, and output falls below its new steady state value.
Our numerical results show that different workers respond in different ways to the
forces just described. In equilibrium, labor supply increases for low-productivity work-
ers at the bottom end of the bond distribution, who are closer to the borrowing limit and
are least interest-sensitive. At the same time, labor supply drops for high-productivity
workers with high bond holdings, who are farther from the limit and are more interest-
sensitive. So behind the drop in output there is a misallocation effect and a drop in
average labor productivity.13
The top panel of Figure 5 shows the paths for output (solid blue line) and total hours
(dashedgreenline)inourbaselinecalibration. Hoursactuallyincreasefollowingacredit
shock, reﬂecting the responses of the agents at the bottom of the bonds distribution.
However, total output drops due to the misallocation effect.
The shape of the labor supply policies is crucial in determining the dynamics of
hours. In particular, when the labor supply policy is less convex, the labor supply of
poor households is less sensitive to a credit crunch. In the bottom panel of Figure 5, we
plot output and hours for an alternative calibration in which the labor supply policy is
less convex. To plot this ﬁgure, we reduce the upper bound on hours per week used to
calibrate y.14 In this case, the labor supply policy function is actually concave in the rele-
vant range. The result is that aggregate employment drops by more than one percentage
point and the output drop is larger than 2%. The misallocation effect is still present, so
average productivity decreases, although less than in the baseline calibration.
13This misallocation effect is closely related to the steady state labor misallocation analyzed in Heath-
cote, Storesletten, and Violante (2008).
14In particular, we assume that the marginal utility of leisure goes to inﬁnity at 50 hours worked per
week instead that at 98 hours. This implies that the ratio of average hours worked to the upper bound is
0.8 instead of 0.4 (see footnote 8).
16Figure 5: Output and Employment Responses
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Our model is able to generate a recession even with perfectly competitive goods and
labor markets. Clearly, adding frictions on the supply side of the model can help in
getting a more realistic picture of the effects of a credit crunch on aggregate activity and
possibly on unemployment. The introduction of nominal rigidities in the next section is
a step in that direction.
To further investigate the consumption response, it is useful to experiment with dif-
ferent values of g. Figure 6 shows the behavior of the interest rate and output with g = 2
(solid blue lines) and, for comparison, in our baseline with g = 4 (dashed green lines).15
Different effects are at work here. On the one hand, the effect of lower risk aversion is
to make the precautionary effect weaker and thus the consumption policy less concave.
On the other hand, lower risk aversion also implies that consumers tend to borrow more
in the initial steady state, so the initial distribution is more spread out to the left. These
two effects go in opposite directions, the ﬁrst decreasing and the second increasing the
initial shift in consumer demand. Finally, a reduction in g also implies a lower elastic-
15All calibrated parameters are re-calibrated when we change g.
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ity of intertemporal substitution, which implies that consumer demand is more interest
rate elastic. The overall effect is that we obtain a slightly smaller drop in the interest rate
and output. However, since opposing effects are present the relation between g and the
initial drops in the interest rate and output is in general non-monotone.
4 Nominal Rigidities
Under ﬂexible prices, the real interest rate is free to adjust to its equilibrium path to equi-
librate the demand and supply of bonds, or—equivalently—the demand and supply of
goods. In this section we explore what happens in a variant of the model with nominal
rigidities. In presence of nominal rigidities, the central bank can affect the path of the
real interest rate by setting the nominal interest rate. However, the zero lower bound
for the nominal interest rate, together with nominal rigidities, implies that the central
bank may not be able to replicate the real interest rate path corresponding to the ﬂexible
price equilibrium. Therefore, a credit crisis which produces a large drop in real interest
18rates under ﬂexible prices can drive the economy into a liquidity trap and into a deeper
recession under sticky prices.
In order to introduce nominal rigidities, we ﬁrst enrich the model with monopolis-
tic competition. The set up is identical to the baseline, except that output is now pro-
duced by a continuum of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms owned by the households
in equal shares. Each ﬁrm produces a good j 2 [0,1] and consumption is a Dixit-Stiglitz
aggregate of these goods. Namely, consumption of household i is given by
cit =
Z 1
0
cit (j)
# 1
# dj
 #
# 1
where cit (j) is household i consumption of good j. We interpret the shock qit as a shock
to the efﬁciency of household i labor. Each ﬁrm produces with a linear technology which
produces one unit of good with one efﬁciency unit of labor, that is, qit goods are pro-
duced with one hour of work of household i. The labor market is perfectly competitive
and wt denotes the nominal wage rate per efﬁciency unit, so the hourly wage for house-
hold i is qitwt.
Firms are owned by households, so the budget constraint is
qtbit+1 + ptcit = bit + wtqitnit   ˜ tit + pt,
where pt is the appropriate price index and pt denotes total nominal proﬁts. Bond hold-
ings, bond prices, and taxes are expressed in nominal terms. Solving the consumers’
expenditure minimization problem, it follows that monopolist j faces the demand
yjt =
 
pjt/pt
 # Ct,
where Ct is aggregate consumption in the economy .
Consider ﬁrst the case of perfectly ﬂexible prices. In this case, the equilibrium is
very similar to that of the perfectly competitive economy of the previous section. The
only differences are that households receive some proﬁt income on top of labor income
and that the real wage per efﬁciency unit is wt/pt = (#   1)/#, which is smaller than
1 because of the ﬁrms’ markup. Therefore, as long as markups are not too big, the
response of the economy to the credit tightening is similar to that of the baseline model.
Turning to the case of sticky prices, assume that ﬁrms face menu costs to adjust nom-
inal prices. In particular, we make the extreme assumption that menu costs are so large
19that ﬁrms leave prices at their initial level, in the equilibrium we analyze. Therefore, we
have pjt = pt = p0 for all j and t.
How does an equilibrium with ﬁxed prices work? Since the price level is constant
at p0, the nominal interest rate is equal to the real interest rate. The central bank, by
choosing a sequence of nominal interest rates, chooses a sequence of real rates rt. Since
nominal wages are ﬂexible, we need to ﬁnd a sequence of wage rates wt that ensures
labor market clearing. These wage rates are in general different from (#   1)/#.16 The
assumption of sticky prices and ﬂexible wages simpliﬁes the analysis as it keeps the
households problem essentially identical to the baseline model. In particular, the opti-
mality condition for labor supply is now
(wt/pt)qitUc(cit,nit) + Un(cit,nit) = 0, (4)
for each household with qit > 0 and the Euler equation is unchanged. Clearly, this
assumption also means that when output contracts below its ﬂexible equilibrium path,
the real wage needs to fall to be consistent with an aggregate reduction in labor supply.
It would be interesting, but outside the scope of this paper, to extend the analysis to
allow for frictional labor markets and wage rigidities.
In the following exercises, we assume that the central bank chooses a path for the
nominal interest rate rt which converges to its ﬂexible price steady state level. This
implies that real wages converge to (#   1)/# so that that the ﬁrms’ incentive to change
nominal prices vanishes in the long run.17
In Figure 7 we consider three scenarios. The dash-dotted black line is the ﬂexible
price baseline. The solid blue line corresponds to a monetary policy in which the cen-
tral bank tries to replicate the ﬂexible-price interest rate path, with the only constraint
that the interest rate cannot go negative. The dashed green line corresponds to a case in
which the real interest rate is stuck at a higher value (1%). This can be interpreted either
as a less aggressive monetary authority or as a situation in which the channel of trans-
mission between the federal funds rate and longer term rates (relevant for consumers’
saving and borrowing decisions) imposes a higher lower bound for the latter. The bot-
16The markup pt/wt is different from ﬁrms’ desired markup #/(#   1), but ﬁrms cannot adjust prices
due to the menu cost.
17All the parameters are calibrated as in the baseline and # is chosen to yield proﬁts to GDP equal to 5%.
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tom right panel of Figure 7 shows that the output responses are larger when the interest
rate fails to adjust.
5 Fiscal policy
We now explore the role of ﬁscal policy in mitigating the recession. In particular, we
focus on simple policies in which the government changes the supply of government
bonds. Increasing the supply of bonds can be beneﬁcial for two reasons. First, there is
a direct increase in the supply of liquid assets that reduces the downward pressure on
the real interest rate. Second, as the government increases bond supply, the associated
deﬁcit can be used to reduce taxes or increase transfers in the short run. In our economy,
this has a positive effect on spending given that Ricardian equivalence does not hold.
Since we assume lump sum taxation, an equivalence result holds between govern-
ment supplied and privately supplied liquidity. Namely, an increase in the supply of
government bonds Bt can exactly offset a change in the borrowing limit f. In particular,
21Figure 8: Fiscal Policy
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the only thing that matters for the equilibrium is the sum Bt +f. This is a common result
in this class of models, and it implies that in principle the government could completely
neutralize the effect of a credit shock, by a sufﬁciently large increase in the supply of
government bonds. However, for the sake of realism, here we look at the effects of poli-
cies that only partially offset the long run change in f, possibly because of unmodelled
concerns with the distortionary effects of higher taxation in the long run.18
Consider, in particular, a policy of increasing gradually the supply of real bonds to a
level B0 that is 20% higher in the new steady state. Namely, assume that Bt follows the
path
Bt = rt
bB +
 
1  rt
b

B0,
with rb = 0.95. We then consider two different ways of spending the deﬁcit associated
to this increase in bond supply. First, we look at a policy where taxes adjust to balance
the government budget in every period. Second, we look at a policy where the gov-
18Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) study the trade off between distortionary taxation and the self-
insurance beneﬁts of government bonds in steady state.
22ernment deﬁcit is used to ﬁnance a temporary increase in the unemployment beneﬁt. In
particular, we let the unemployment beneﬁt to be 50% higher for the ﬁrst two years after
the shock. Figure 8 shows what happens to the interest rate and output under these two
policies. The solid blue lines represent the policy in which the increase in Bt ﬁnances a
temporary reduction in the tax tt; the dashed green lines represent the policy in which
the deﬁcit goes partly to ﬁnance an increase in the unemployment beneﬁt ut.
The ﬁgure shows that increasing the supply of government bonds dampens the re-
sponses of both interest rates and output. Moreover, increasing the unemployment ben-
eﬁt in the short run has larger effects than reducing the lump-sum tax, because it is a
policy targeted towards households that are more likely to be credit constrained.
6 Durable Goods
In this section, we extend the baseline model to include durable goods. A large part of
household borrowing is associated to durable purchases and takes the form of secured
debt, in which durables serve as collateral. Therefore, a model with durables is more
realistic in capturing both the motive for borrowing and the nature of the credit limit.
A model with durables enriches the household portfolio decision.19 As durables
offer an alternative store of value, when the precautionary demand for assets increases,
itcanbedirectednotonlytowardsbondsbutalsotowardsdurables. Thiscanpotentially
lead to an increase in durable accumulation as a result of an increase in precautionary
savings. An opposing force is at work on the borrowers’ side: reduced credit access
implies that borrowers need to sell durables in order to reduce their debt. This leads to
durable goods decumulation. Whether the force on the savers’ side or on the borrowers’
side dominates, depends on the model parameters and on the nature of the shock hitting
the economy, as we will see shortly.
Households’ portfolio decisions are also affected by the fact that durables are a less
liquid form of savings than bonds. To capture the illiquidity of durable goods, we as-
sume that households face a discount when re-selling durables. When households build
up precautionary reserves following a credit shock, they tend to prefer more liquid as-
19Krueger and Fernandez-Villaverde (2011) emphasize the importance of durable wealth to understand
households’ life cycle consumption and portfolio allocation.
23sets, favoring bonds over durable goods. This reduces the increase in durable demand
by savers and tends to generate an overall reduction in durable purchases. The interest-
ing ﬁnding here is that in a model with liquid and illiquid assets a credit shock can lead,
at the same time, to an increase in demand for the liquid asset and to a reduction in de-
mand for the illiquid asset. This captures a form of “ﬂight to liquidity” on the household
side.
Households preferences are now represented by the utility function
E
"
¥
å
t=0
btU(cit,kit,nit)
#
,
where cit is non-durable consumption, the service ﬂow from durables is proportional to
the stock of durables kit, and nit is labor effort.
Each period durables depreciate at the rate d and the household chooses whether to
increase or decrease its durable stock. A household that wants to increase its durable
stock to kit+1 > kit needs to spend kit+1   kit plus dkit to cover the depreciation of the
existing stock. A household that wants instead to reduce its durable stock to kit+1 <
kit faces additional reselling costs proportional to the capital sold, z (kit   kit+1). The
parameter z > 0 determines the illiquidity of durable goods. These assumptions are
summarized in the adjustment cost function
g(kit+1,kit) =

kit+1   kit + dkit if kit+1  kit
(1  z)(kit+1   kit) + dkit if kit+1 < kit
.
We assume that 1   z > d, so the household can always liquidate part of its durable
stock to cover for depreciation.20
We also extend the model to introduce a spread between borrowing and lending
interest rates. Speciﬁcally, we assume that if a household is a net seller of bonds, i.e.,
if bit+1 < 0, the household needs to buy intermediation services from a competitive
banking sector. A banking ﬁrm incurs a proportional intermediation cost of c per dollar
of bonds issued, which captures monitoring and collection costs. This implies that the
20An alternative approach to modeling transaction costs—made in Grossman and Laroque (1990) and
Gruber and Martin (2003)—is to assume that when agents choose kt+1 6= kt they have to sell kt at
price (1  z)kt and buy kt+1 at full price. So g(kt+1,kt) = kt+1   (1  z)kt + dkt if kt+1 6= kt and
g(kt+1,kt) = dkt otherwise. A large literature takes explicitly into account the lumpiness of durable
purchases associated to various ﬁxed costs of adjustment (e.g., Caballero, 1990, and more recently Leahy
and Zeira, 2005). An advantage of our approach is that it keeps the household’s problem concave.
24household receives a net price ˆ qt = (1  c)qt per bond issued and banks make zero
proﬁts. Letting b+
it denote positive bond holdings and b 
it denote negative holdings, the
household’s budget constraint is then
qtb+
it+1 + ˆ qtb 
it+1 + g(kit+1,kit) + cit + ˜ tit  bit + yit,
where the tax ˜ tit depends on the household’s productivity qit as in the baseline model.
The spread between borrowing and lending rates is equal to
1
ˆ qt
 
1
qt
=
1
qt
c
1  c
,
and is approximately equal to c for low values of c and rt.
The production side of the model is as in the benchmark model, with a linear pro-
duction function yit = qitnit and an exogenous Markov process for qit. For simplicity,
durable and non-durable goods are produced with the same technology, so the relative
price of durables is 1.21
The household’s borrowing constraint is
bit+1   fkkit+1. (5)
The household debt is collateralized by its durable holdings. The parameter fk denotes
the fraction of the value of the durable that can be used as collateral, that is, the maxi-
mum loan-to-value ratio.
The government budget constraint is unchanged:
Bt + utu = qtBt+1 + tt.
As in the baseline, we ﬁx the supply of government bonds and the unemployment ben-
eﬁt at the levels B and u, and let the tax tt adjust to satisfy budget balance.
6.1 Equilibrium and calibration
The main difference with the baseline model is that durable goods are now an additional
state variable. Optimal household policies are now functions of the three-dimensional
21Different technological assumptions would introduce endogenous price dynamics for durables, pos-
sibly adding an ampliﬁcation channel ` a la Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
25state (b,k,q): the initial stock of bonds, the initial stock of durables, and current pro-
ductivity. These three states fully determine the household’s choice of non-durable and
durable purchases, labor supply and the optimal level of borrowing or lending.
Let Yt (b,k,q) denote the joint distribution of b, k and q in the population. Combin-
ing the household’s optimal transition for bond holdings and durable goods with the
exogenous Markov process for productivity, we obtain the transition probability of the
individual state, and, aggregating, a transition for the distribution Yt. The deﬁnition of
equilibrium is then the natural generalization of deﬁnition 1, where the bonds market
clearing condition is now Z
bdYt (b,k,q) = B.
To calibrate the model we adopt the utility function:
U(c,k,n) =
 
cak1 a1 g
1  g
+ y
(1  n)
1 h
1  h
.
We choose a simple Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation to aggregate durable and non-durable
consumption.22 Therefore, a is the ratio of non-durable consumption to total consump-
tion. To compute this ratio we compute durables as the sum of durable consumption
and consumption of housing services from NIPA. We take all other consumption (non-
durable goods and non-housing services) as nondurables. The average value for 2000-
2010 gives us a = 0.7. As in our baseline exercise, we choose b to get a 2.5% yearly
interest rate, set the coefﬁcient of risk aversion g = 4, choose h to obtain an average
Frisch elasticity of 1, and choose y so that average hours worked are 40% of the time
endowment. Also for the wage process, the transitions between employment and un-
employment, and the unemployment beneﬁt we follow our baseline calibration.23
For the accumulation of durable goods, we need to choose d and z. We set d =
1.29% to match the depreciation rate from NIPA Fixed Assets Tables. The parameter z
represents the cost of selling durable goods and captures their illiquidity. We set it to
15%.
Finally we need to choose fk, the intermediation cost c, and the bond supply B. We
set fk to 0.8, which is in the range of loan-to-value ratios in mortgages and durable
22Ogaki and Reinhart (1998) offer evidence in favor of an elasticity of substitution between durables
and non-durables close to 1.
23However, we now approximate the wage with a 5-state Markov chain, for computational reasons.
26Table 2: Parameter Values: Durable Model
Parameter Explanation Value Target/Source
b Discount factor 0.9713 Interest rate r = 2.5%
g Coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion 4
h Curvature of utility from leisure 1.50 Average Frisch elasticity = 1
y Coefﬁcient on leisure in utility 2.54 Average hours worked = 0.4
a Coefﬁcient on non-durables 0.7 Ratio of non-durable and non-
housing services to total per-
sonal consumption expenditures
in NIPA (2000-10 average)
d Durables depreciation rate 0.0129 BEA Fixed Asset Tables ratio of de-
preciation to net stock, (2000-8 av-
erage, Hall, 2011b)
z Proportional loss on durable sales 0.15
c Intermediation cost 0.01
r Persistence of productivity shock 0.967 Persistence of wage process in Flo-
den and Lind´ e (2001)
s# Variance of productivity shock 0.017 VarianceofwageprocessinFloden
and Lind´ e (2001)
pe,u Transition to unemployment 0.057 Shimer (2005)
pu,e Transition to employment 0.882 Shimer (2005)
u Unemployment beneﬁt 0.160 40% of average labor income
(Shimer, 2005)
fk Max loan-to-value ratio 0.8
B Bond supply 1.60 Liquid-assets-to-GDP ratio of 1.78
Note: The quantities u and B are expressed in terms of yearly aggregate output. See the text for
details on the targets.
27loans.24 The parameter c is set at 1%, so our exercise starts from a fairly low initial
spread. The supply of government bonds B is chosen as in the baseline, to match the
ratio of liquid assets to GDP equal to 1.78. The parameters used are summarized in
Table 2.
6.2 Characterization and steady state
The new ingredient, relative to the baseline problem, is that households face a portfo-
lio choice. Each period, households choose their labor effort nit and non-durable con-
sumption cit as in the baseline model. These choices determine their saving, gross of
durable purchases, yit   cit   ˜ tit (from now on, “gross saving”). But then they also need
to choose how to allocate this saving between durable purchases and bond accumula-
tion. The optimality conditions characterizing household behavior are derived in the
appendix. Here we just provide some intuition for the optimal portfolio dynamics.
The kinked adjustment cost for durables implies that the optimal portfolio is charac-
terized by two adjustment bands. In particular, for a given productivity qit, the optimal
portfolio (bit+1,kit+1) always lies in a region like the grey region in Figure 9 (which cor-
responds to qit = 1). The dashed green line corresponds to the borrowing limit, which
is proportional to durable holdings. Given an initial capital stock, say kit = 7, the locus
of possible optimal portfolios is given by the solid blue line.25 Our numerical analysis
shows that a household starting at portfolio P1 (bit =  1.5,kit = 7) will choose pos-
itive gross saving, keep its durable holdings unchanged, and allocate its gross saving
to debt repayment, moving along the arrow originating at P1. A more indebted house-
hold, starting at portfolio P2 (bit =  5.3,kit = 7) will also choose positive gross saving,
but it will also sell some durables and use its gross saving plus the receipts from the
durables sale to repay its debt, moving along the arrow originating at P2 so as to reach
the blue line. The common element is that all households starting at kit, irrespective of
their initial bond holdings, will choose an end-of-period portfolio on the blue line.26
24The debt-to-GDP ratio we obtain is 54%. We do not try to choose fk to match observed debt-to-
GDP ratios in the household sector (which prior to the crisis went above 100%) because, given our other
parameters, our model cannot deliver debt-to-GDP ratios above 70%.
25See the appendix for a formal deﬁnition of this locus.
26Notice that both boundaries of the adjustment region have a vertical segment at b = 0. This vertical
segment is due to the spread between borrowing and lending rates.
28Figure 9: Portfolio Choice in the Model with Durables
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The shape of the adjustment region in Figure 9 is similar for all values of q. Therefore,
thesupportofthesteadystatedistributionofbondsanddurableholdingstakesasimilar
shape, as can be seen in Figure 10. In this ﬁgure, we plot the contours of the steady
state distribution. The dashed green line represents again the borrowing limit. At low
levels of total wealth (bonds plus durables) we ﬁnd households who hold small durable
stocks and small amounts of debt. If a household receives a positive productivity shock,
it responds by accumulating durables and taking on more debt, given that the shock is
expected to persist. If the household stays at high productivity, it eventually starts to
pay off its debt and then goes on to accumulate positive bond holdings. If instead the
household is hit by a negative shock, in a ﬁrst phase it will adjust only by selling bonds
and, in a second phase, it will adjusts also by selling durables.27
The portfolio dynamics just described help to account for the fact that the distribu-
tion tends to be concentrated at the boundaries of the adjustment regions, given that if
households are on the boundary and are not hit by a shock, they remain on the bound-
27Depending on the shock and the initial bond holdings, the ﬁrst phase can be absent and the household
can start selling durables right away.
29Figure 10: Steady State Distribution of Bonds and Durables
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ary. Moreover, there is a mass of households at, or near, the borrowing limit. Unlike
in the baseline model, they are not only the households with the lowest total wealth
(bonds plus durable holdings), but also middle-wealth households with levered hold-
ings of durable goods.
6.3 Credit crunch
For the model with durables, we consider three different credit-tightening exercises, by
looking at the effects of a permanent reduction in the borrowing limit fk, and a perma-
nent and a temporary increase in the spread c. As in our baseline exercise, all these
shocks are unexpected and hit the economy in steady state. All three exercises feature
overshooting in the interest rate as in the baseline, although with different strengths. On
the output side, however, the implications of the three shocks are quite different.
Our ﬁrst exercise is a permanent contraction in the borrowing limit fk from 0.8 to
0.56, which yields a 10 percentage points reduction in the household debt-to-GDP ratio
from 54% to 44%. The contraction in fk is gradual and follows a linear path that lasts
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6 quarters. Figure 11 shows that the contraction in the interest rate is less strong than
in our baseline exercise and that output actually increases by a 0.4%. The reason be-
hind these results is that durable purchases are a much more interest elastic component
of consumer spending. So a smaller interest rate reduction is needed to equilibrate the
goods market (and hence the bonds market) and total spending is actually higher at the
new equilibrium. This is conﬁrmed by the bottom right panel of Figure 11, which shows
that there is a contraction in non-durable spending, similar in size to the contraction ob-
tained in our baseline, but this contraction is more than compensated by a 4% increase
in durable spending. Numerical experiments show that this increase in durable spend-
ing is due to the interest rate adjustment: a simple disequilibrium exercise shows that
durable spending would drop by about 18% if the interest rate adjusted immediately to
its new long run level, which is 2.2%. A short lived drop in the interest rate to 0.9% is
sufﬁcient to turn a 18% contraction in durable spending into a 4% increase. This may
seem an unrealistically large interest elasticity of durable spending which indicates that
31Figure 12: Responses to a Permanent Shock to the Intermediation Cost c
0 20 40
0
1
2
3
intermediation cost χ
0 20 40
1.5
2
2.5
3
interest rate
0 20 40
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
output
0 20 40
−5
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
durable and non durable purchases
 
 
non durables
durables
Note: Interest rate is in annual terms. Quantities are in percent deviation from initial steady
state.
in our model bonds and durables remain very good substitutes, despite the illiquidity
cost. This points in the direction of extending the model using alternative speciﬁcations
of the durables adjustment cost or accounting explicitly for the price risk associated with
durablepurchases(especiallyofhousing), toreducethesubstitutabilitybetweenthetwo
assets. We leave these developments to future work.
Our second experiment is to look at the effects of a spread shock: a permanent in-
crease of the intermediation cost c from 1% to 2.21%. As in previous experiments, the
size of the shock is chosen to obtain a 10 percentage point long run reduction in the
debt-to-GDP ratio. The results are presented in Figure 12. The effects of this shock are
much more gradual, as there is no forced deleveraging and borrowers are allowed to
adjust their borrowing positions over time. However, the shock is more pervasive, as it
affects all borrowers and not just those near the borrowing limit. Therefore, the effect
is a drop in output, with a contraction in durable purchases of about 3% and an almost
negligible drop in non-durables. The smoother response of non-durables is due to the
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fact that the shock is less concentrated on the agents near the borrowing limit, who have
a higher marginal propensity to consume out of liquid wealth.
Given the gradual nature of the spread shock just analyzed, it is useful to also con-
sider a larger, but temporary spread shock. Therefore, we now look at the effects of a
shock that increases the intermediation cost by 6 percentage points at an annual rate.
We assume the shock decays geometrically with a rate of decay of 0.6.28 This implies
that the rate on a 1 year loan goes up by about 3.9% in the ﬁrst quarter after the shock.
Hall (2011a) uses the same shock (in the context of a different model) and argues that
it is a reasonable representation of the credit shock experienced in the U.S. 2008-2009
recession. The responses to this shock are in Figure 13. The shock has a much larger, but
short lived effects on quantities, with a 3.5% output drop. As in the case of a persistent
shock, the adjustment is now all in durables ( 17.2%), while non-durables are essen-
tially unchanged. This shock is sufﬁciently large to drive the interest rate into negative
28That is, we have ct = 0.0025+ 0.015 0.6 (t 1), for t = 1,2,....
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values. Therefore, we can ask what happens with ﬁxed prices and a central bank that
tries to replicate the ﬂexible price interest rate path subject to the zero lower bound. As
in Section 4, we extend the model by introducing monopolistic competition and large
menu costs. The results for this case are in Figure 14. Now there is a very large con-
traction in durable purchases ( 44.5%), which leads to a 9.7% output contraction. Once
more, we see the effects of the very large interest elasticity of durable purchases. Sticky
prices cause the real interest rate to be off by about 1.5%, relative to the ﬂexible price
case, and this is sufﬁcient to reduce durable purchases by an additional 27%, causing
a much deeper recession. As argued above, it would be interesting to develop models
where durable purchases are less interest elastic.
It is useful to remark two differences between our baseline model and our model
with durables. First, the two calibrations lead to very different values for household
total net worth. In the baseline, households only hold liquid wealth, and net worth
34over GDP is 1.60.29 In the model with durables, households also hold durable wealth,
and net worth over GDP is 5.27.30 However, net worth to GDP is not the only variable
determining how important are liquidity constraints, given the different liquidity of the
two assets. This point is related to Kaplan and Violante (2011), who also emphasize that
adjustment costs imply that “rich” households’ consumption behavior can still be far
from permanent income predictions.
Second, as argued above, in the baseline model the most indebted households are
the households with lowest total wealth, while here they are intermediate-wealth house-
holds, with large levered positions in durables. These households can still be induced
to adjust nondurable consumption if they are close to their constraint, as seen from
the nondurable response in our ﬁrst exercise (Figure 11). However, when we look at
a spread shock that hits all indebted households equally, the typical household hit by
the shock now prefers to smooth nondurable consumption and adjust to the shock by
selling durables. This helps to explain why the nondurable response is muted in our
second and third exercises (Figures 12 and 13) while there is a larger adjustment in
durables. In future work, it will be interesting to explore further different combina-
tions of shocks to loan-to-value ratios and to spreads, to understand how they affect
differentially households with different initial portfolios, and to compare these results
with empirical evidence on the disaggregated response of consumption.
7 Concluding Remarks
We have proposed a model with uninsurable idiosyncratic risk to show how a credit
crunch can generate a recession with low interest rates, due to a combination of debt
repayments and an increase in precautionary savings. This helps to explain why reces-
sions driven by ﬁnancial market trouble are more likely to drive the economy into a
liquidity trap.
A simplifying assumption in our model is that the unemployment risk is exogenous
and not affected by the credit crunch. It would be interesting to develop a version of
the model with an explicit treatment of labor market frictions, in which the labor market
29Liquid wealth to GDP is 1.78 and debt to GDP is 0.18.
30Liquid wealth to GDP is 1.78, durable wealth over GDP is 4.03, and debt to GDP is 0.54.
35response to a drop in consumer demand leads to an endogenous increase in unemploy-
ment.31
Finally, a missing element in the analysis is capital. Adding capital to the model
requires a theory of why claims to physical capital cannot be costlessly transformed into
perfectly liquid assets like the bonds of our model. A way to move in this direction
would be to combine our analysis of the household sector with ﬁnancial frictions on the
ﬁrms’ side or a richer model of intermediation.
31Krusell, Mukoyama, and Sahin (2010) introduce search frictions in an Ayiagari (1994) incomplete
markets environment. Hall (2011c) discusses ways of adding search frictions to monetary environments
with a binding zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate.
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A.1 Baseline model
Herewedescribethealgorithmusedtocomputesteadystatesandtransitionaldynamics
of the baseline model. The MATLAB codes are available on our web pages.
Let us begin from the steady state computations. First, we describe how optimal
policies and the bond distribution are computed for a given steady state interest rate r.
To compute the policy functions C(b,q) and N (b,q), we iterate on the Euler equation
and the optimality condition for labor supply on a discrete grid for the state variable b.
To iterate on the policy functions, we use the endogenous gridpoints method of Carroll
(2006). To compute the invariant distribution Y(b,q) we derive the inverse of the bond
accumulation policy, denoted by g(b,q), from the policy functions, and update the con-
ditional bond distribution using the formula Y(k) (bjq) = å˜ q Y(k 1)(g
 
b, ˜ q

j˜ q)P(˜ qjq) for
all b   f, where k stands for the k-th iteration and P(˜ qjq) is the probability of qt 1 = ˜ q
conditional on qt = q. Due to the borrowing constraint, the bond accumulation policy
is not invertible at b =  f, but the formula above still holds deﬁning g( f,q) as the
largest b such that b0 =  f is optimal. Finally, we search for the interest rate r that clears
the bond market.
To compute transitional dynamics, we get the initial bond distribution Y0 (b,q) from
the initial steady state. We then compute the ﬁnal steady at f = f0. We choose T large
enough that the economy is approximately at the new steady state at t = T (we use T =
200in thesimulations reported). Next, we guessa pathof interest rates frtg with rT = r0.
We take the consumption policy to be at the ﬁnal steady state level at t = T, setting
CT (b,q) = C0 (b,q), and we compute the sequence of policies fCt (b,q), Nt (b,q)g using
the Euler equation and the optimality condition for labor supply, going backward from
t = T   1 to t = 0 (using the endogenous gridpoints method). Next, we compute
the sequence of distributions Yt (b,q) going forward from t = 0 to t = T, starting at
Y0 (b,q), using the optimal policies fCt (b,q), Nt (b,q)g to derive the bond accumulation
policy (using the same updating formula as in the steady state). We then compute the
aggregate bond demand Bt for t = 0,...T and update the interest rate path using the
simple linear updating rule r
(k)
t = r
(k 1)
t   e(B
(k)
t   ¯ B). Choosing the parameter e > 0
small enough the algorithm converges to bond market clearing for all t = 0,...T.
37A.2 Model with durables
A.2.1 Derivations
Here we derive optimality conditions for the model with durables. We focus on the
steady state for ease of notation, but analogous derivations apply to the transitional
dynamics (adding time subscripts). The Bellman equation is
V (b,k,q) = max
c,n,k0,b0 U (c,k,n) + bE

V
 
b0,k0,q0
jq

s.t. b + qn   t (q)  qb0
+ + ˆ qb0
  + g
 
k0,k

+ c,
b0 + fkk0  0.
The ﬁrst order conditions for this problem are as follows. For c and n:
Uc (c,k,n) = l,
 Un (c,k,n) = ql and n > 0 or   Un (c,k,n)  ql and n = 0.
For b0 and k0:
bE

Vb
 
b0,k0,q0
jq

+ m = ql if b0 > 0,
bE

Vb
 
b0,k0,q0
jq

+ m = ˆ ql if b0 < 0,
ql  bE

Vb
 
b0,k0,q0
jq

+ m  ˆ ql if b0 = 0
bE

Vk
 
b0,k0,q0
jq

+ mfk = l if k0 > k,
bE

Vk
 
b0,k0,q0
jq

+ mfk = l(1  z) if k0 < k,
l  bE

Vk
 
b0,k0,q0
jq

+ mfk  l(1  z) if k0 = k.
The complementary slackness condition for the borrowing constraint requires that b0 +
fkk0 = 0 if m > 0 and m = 0 if b0 + fkk0 > 0. The locus of optimal portfolios depicted in
Figure 9 corresponds to the set of pairs (b0,k0) that satisfy the optimality conditions for
b0 and k0 and the complementary slackness condition for m, for some positive l.
The envelope conditions are as follows. For b,
Vb (b,k,q) = l;
for k,
Vk (b,k,q) = Uk (c,k,n) + l(1  d) if k0 > k
Vk (b,k,q) = Uk (c,k,n) + l(1  d   z) if k0 < k
38and
Vk (b,k,q) = Uk (c,k,n)   dl + bE

Vk
 
b0,k0,q0
jq

+ mfk if k0 = k.
Using the ﬁrst order conditions, the envelope condition for k can be written compactly
as
Vk (b,k,q) = Uk (c,k,n)   dl + bE

Vk
 
b0,k0,q0
jq

+ mfk.
A.2.2 Computation
Here we describe the algorithm used to compute the model with durables. The MAT-
LAB codes are available on our web pages.
Thecomputationofthemodelwithdurablesalsoexploitstheendogenousgridpoints
method. However, adapting this method to the case of two endogenous state variables
requires some extra steps, which are described here. Our approach is similar to Hin-
termeier and Koeniger (2010), in that we ﬁrst ﬁnd the subset of potentially optimal
portfolios in the space (b0,k0) and then take the backward step typical of the endoge-
nous gridpoints method only starting from pairs (b0,k0) in this subspace. However,
unlike Hintermeier and Koeniger (2010), our approach focuses on computing the partial
derivatives of the value function instead that on the policy functions.
Deﬁne
Vb
 
b0,k0,q

 E

Vb
 
b0,k0,q0
jq

, (6)
Vk
 
b0,k0,q

 E

Vk
 
b0,k0,q0
jq

. (7)
Our objective is to approximate the functions Vb and Vk with piecewise linear functions
on the discrete grids

b0,...,bn	
and

k0,...,km	
. We start with an initial guess for Vb
and Vk and proceed as follows.
1. Find the set of pairs (b0,k0) that are optimal for some state (b,k,q). To do so, let k and
k0 vary (independently) on the grid

k0,...,km	
and let q vary on

q0,...,qS	
. For
each tripe (k,k0,q), three cases are possible: k0 > k, k0 < k and k0 = k. In each case,
we want to ﬁnd the value(s) of b0 consistent with optimality.
(a) If k0 > k, choose the value of b0 that satisﬁes one of the following optimality
39conditions:
qVk
 
b0,k0,q

= Vb
 
b0,k0,q

and b0 > 0,
or qVk
 
b0,k0,q

 Vb
 
b0,k0,q

 ˆ qVk
 
b0,k0,q

and b0 = 0,
or ˆ qVk
 
b0,k0,q

= Vb
 
b0,k0,q

and   fkk0 < b0 < 0,
or ˆ qVk
 
b0,k0,q

 Vb
 
b0,k0,q

and b0 =  fkk0.
(b) If k0 < k, choose the value of b0 that satisﬁes one of the following optimality
conditions:
qVk
 
b0,k0,q

= (1  z)Vb
 
b0,k0,q

and b0 > 0,
or qVk
 
b0,k0,q

 (1  z)Vb
 
b0,k0,q

 ˆ qVk
 
b0,k0,q

and b0 = 0,
or ˆ qVk
 
b0,k0,q

= (1  z)Vb
 
b0,k0,q

and   fkk0 < b0 < 0,
or ˆ qVk
 
b0,k0,q

 (1  z)Vb
 
b0,k0,q

and b0 =  fkk0.
(c) If k0 = k, there is an interval of values of b0 consistent with optimality, which
we denote [b0
L,b0
U]. b0
L is the value that solves the conditions in (1.a) and b0
U is
the value that solves the conditions in (1.b). Clearly, in some cases b0
L = b0
U
and the interval is degenerate.
2. Derive the associated values of the Lagrange multipliers. For each tripe (k,k0,q), given
the value(s) of b0 found in step 1, we derive values for the Lagrange multipliers l
and m. Again, there are three cases.
(a) k0 > k. If the associated b0 is equal to  fkk0 ﬁnd m that solves
bVb
 
b0,k0,q

+ m = bˆ qVk
 
b0,k0,q

+ fk ˆ qm,
otherwise set m = 0. Then set l = bVk (b0,k0,q) + fkm.
(b) k0 < k. If the associated b0 is equal to  fkk0 ﬁnd m that solves
b(1  z)Vb
 
b0,k0,q

+ (1  z)m = bˆ qVk
 
b0,k0,q

+ fk ˆ qm,
otherwise set m = 0. Then set l = bVk (b0,k0,q) + fkm.
40(c) k0 = k. Now there are in general different triples (b0,m,l) consistent with
optimality. We derive them as follows, depending on the values b0
L and b0
U
derived in (1.c).
i. If b0
L = b0
U =  fkk0, form a sequence of triples (b0,m,l) with b0 =  fkk0,
m taking values in the interval

b
ˆ qVk (b0,k0,q)   Vb (b0,k0,q)
1  fk ˆ q
, b
ˆ qVk (b0,k0,q)   (1  z)Vb (b0,k0,q)
1  z   fk ˆ q

,
and l = (bVb (b0,k0,q) + m)/ˆ q.
ii. If b0
L =  fkk0 < b0
U, form a sequence of triples (b0,m,l) as follows: ﬁrst, a
sequence of triples with b0 =  f   fkk0, m taking values in the interval

0, b
ˆ qVk (b0,k0,q)   (1  z)Vb (b0,k0,q)
1  z   fk ˆ q

,
and l = (bVb (b0,k0,q) + m)/ˆ q; next, a sequence with b0 taking values
in the interval (b0
L,b0
U], m = 0, and l = bVb (b0,k0,q)/ˆ q if b0 < 0 and
l = bVb (b0,k0,q)/q if b0 > 0.
iii. If  fkk0 < b0
L < b0
U, form a sequence of triples (b0,m,l) with b0 taking
values in [b0
L,b0
U], m = 0, and l = bVb (b0,k0,q)/ˆ q if b0 < 0 and l =
bVb (b0,k0,q)/q if b0 > 0.
iv. Finally, if b0
U  0  b0
L, add to the sequences of triples (b0,m,l) in (i)-
(iii) a sequence with b0 = 0, m = 0, and l taking values in the interval
[bmaxfVb/q,Vkg, bminfVb/ˆ q,Vk/(1  z)g].
3. Derive the associated values of the control variables and of the initial state b. For each
combination (k,k0,q,b0,m,l) derived in 1 and 2, compute c,n,b that solve
Uc (c,k,n) = l,
 Un (c,k,n) = ql,
and
b = qb0+ + ˆ qb0  + g
 
k0,k

+ c   qn + ˜ t (q).
414. Update Vb and Vk. For each combination (k,k0,q,b0,m,l,c,n,b) derived in 1-3, use
the envelope conditions
Vb (b,k,q) = l,
Vk (b,k,q) = Uk (c,k,n)   dl + bVk
 
b0,k0,q

+ fkm,
conditions (6)-(7) and the Markov process for q to compute new values of Vb and
Vk. The values of k are on the grid

k0,...,km	
by construction, but the values of b
are not in

b0,...,bn	
, so in this step we use a linear interpolation to compute the
values on the grid

b0,...,bn	
.
Steps 1 to 4 are repeated until convergence of the functions Vb and Vk.
The computation of the optimal policy for the transitional dynamics follow the same
approach, except that the functions Vb and Vk have a time index.
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